We can patch it for you wholesale

…but remembering costs extra.

Every once in a while, I come across a patch someone sent me, or which I developed in response to a bug report I received, but it’s been weeks or months and I can’t for the life of me remember where it came from, or what it’s for.

Case in point—I’m typing this on a laptop I haven’t used in over two months, and one of the first things I found when I powered it on and opened Chrome was a tab with the following patch:

diff --git a/lib/libpam/modules/pam_login_access/pam_login_access.c b/lib/libpam/modules/pam_login_access/pam_login_access.c
index 945d5eb..b365aee 100644
--- a/lib/libpam/modules/pam_login_access/pam_login_access.c
+++ b/lib/libpam/modules/pam_login_access/pam_login_access.c
@@ -79,20 +79,23 @@ pam_sm_acct_mgmt(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags __unused,

        gethostname(hostname, sizeof hostname);

-       if (rhost == NULL || *(const char *)rhost == '\0') {
+       if (tty != NULL && *(const char *)tty != '\0') {
                PAM_LOG("Checking login.access for user %s on tty %s",
                    (const char *)user, (const char *)tty);
                if (login_access(user, tty) != 0)
                        return (PAM_SUCCESS);
                PAM_VERBOSE_ERROR("%s is not allowed to log in on %s",
                    user, tty);
-       } else {
+       } else if (rhost != NULL && *(const char *)rhost != '\0') {
                PAM_LOG("Checking login.access for user %s from host %s",
                    (const char *)user, (const char *)rhost);
                if (login_access(user, rhost) != 0)
                        return (PAM_SUCCESS);
                PAM_VERBOSE_ERROR("%s is not allowed to log in from %s",
                    user, rhost);
+       } else {
+               PAM_VERBOSE_ERROR("neither host nor tty is set");
+               return (PAM_SUCCESS);
        }

        return (PAM_AUTH_ERR);

The patch fixes a long-standing bug in pam_login_access(8) (the code assumes that either PAM_TTY or PAM_RHOST is defined, and crashes if they are both NULL), but I only have the vaguest recollection of the conversation that led up to it. If you’re the author, please contact me so I can give proper credit when I commit it.

On testing, part III

I just got word of an embarrassing bug in OpenPAM Nummularia. The is_upper() macro, which is supposed to evaluate to true if its argument is an upper-case letter in the ASCII character set, only evaluates to true for the letter A:

#define is_upper(ch)                            \
        (ch >= 'A' && ch <= 'A')

This macro is never used directly, but it is referenced by is_letter(), which is referenced by is_pfcs(), which is used to validate paths and path-like strings, i.e. service names and module names or paths. As a consequence, OpenPAM does not support services or modules which contain an upper-case letter other than A. I never noticed because a) none of the services or modules in use on the systems I use to develop and test OpenPAM have upper-case letters in their names and b) there are no unit or regression tests for the character classification macros, nor for any code path that uses them (except openpam_readword(), which uses is_lws() and is_ws()).

The obvious course of action is to add unit tests for the character classification macros (r760) and then fix the bug (r761). In this case, complete coverage is easy to achieve since there are only 256 possible inputs for each predicate.

I have merged the fix to FreeBSD head (r262529 and r262530). Impatient users can fix their system by running the following commands:

% cd /usr/src/contrib/openpam
% svn diff -r758:762 svn://svn.openpam.org/openpam/trunk | patch
% cd /usr/src/lib/libpam/libpam
% make && make install

Unsurprisingly, writing more unit tests for OpenPAM is moving up on my TODO list. Please contact me if you have the time and inclination to help out.

Geograhva?

Israel, Syria eller Tyrkia teller nemlig ikke.Dagbladets ellers ganske oppgående spillmagasin Press Fire kan fortelle oss at Assassin’s Creed neppe kommer til å besøke Midtøsten. Til det har jeg følgende å si:

  1. Egypt er i Nordafrika, men la oss være greie og inkludere Egypt og Tyrkia i Midtøsten.
  2. Assassin’s Creed (det første spillet) finner sted i det som i dag er Israel og Syria.
  3. Assassin’s Creed II har en flashback til en scene som utspiller seg i Akko underveis i eller kort tid etter handlingen i det første spillet.
  4. Assassin’s Creed: Brotherhood (det tredje spillet) lar deg sende agenter på oppdrag i Midtøsten.
  5. Assassin’s Creed Revelations (det fjerde) finner sted i det som i dag er Tyrkia.
  6. Assassin’s Creed Revelations lar deg også sende agenter på oppdrag i Midtøsten, selv om hovedpersonen aldri reiser dit.

VerifyHostKeyDNS

The Internet Society likes my work. I aim to please…

One of the things I did in the process of importing LDNS and Unbound into FreeBSD 10 was to change the default value for VerifyHostKeyDNS from “no” to “yes” in our OpenSSH when compiled with LDNS support (which can be turned off by adding WITHOUT_LDNS=YES to /etc/src.conf before buildworld).

The announcement the ISOC blog post refers to briefly explains my reasons for doing so:

I consider this a lesser evil than “ask” (aka “train the user to type ‘yes’ and hit enter”) and “no” (aka “train the user to type ‘yes’ and hit enter without even the benefit of a second opinion”).

There were objections to this (which I’m too lazy to dig up and quote) along the lines of:

  • Shouldn’t OpenSSH tell you that it found and used an SSHFP record?
  • Shouldn’t known_hosts entries take precedence over SSHFP records?
  • Shouldn’t OpenSSH store the key in known_hosts after verifying it against an SSHFP record?

The answer to all of the above is “yes, but…”

Here is how host key verification should work, ideally:

  1. Obtain host key from server
  2. Gather cached host keys from various sources (known_hosts, SSHFP, LDAP…)
  3. If we found one or more cached keys:
    1. Check for and warn about inconsistencies between these sources
    2. Check for and warn about inconsistencies between the cached key and what the server sent us
    3. If we got a match from a trusted source, continue connecting
    4. Inform the user of any matches from untrusted sources
  4. Display the key’s fingerprint
  5. Ask the user whether to:
    1. Store the server’s key for future reference and continue connecting
    2. Continue connecting without storing the key
    3. Disconnect

The only configuration required here is a list of trusted and untrusted sources, the difference being that a match or mismatch from a trusted source is normative while a match or mismatch from an untrusted source is merely informative.

Unfortunately, in OpenSSH, SSHFP support seems to have been grafted onto the existing logic rather than integrated into it. Here’s how it actually works:

  1. Obtain host key from server
  2. If VerifyHostKeyDNS is “yes” or “ask”, look for SSHFP records in DNS
  3. If an SSHFP record was found:
    1. If it matches the server’s key:
      1. If it has a valid DNSSEC signature and VerifyHostKeyDNS is “yes”, continue connecting
      2. Otherwise, set a flag to indicate that a matching SSHFP record was found
    2. Otherwise, warn about the mismatch
  4. Look for cached keys in the user and system host key files
  5. If we got a match from the host key files, continue connecting
  6. If we did not find anything in the host key files:
    1. If we found a matching SSHFP record, tell the user
    2. Ask the user whether to:
      1. Store the server’s key for future reference and continue connecting
      2. Disconnect
  7. If we found a matching revoked key in the host key files, warn the user and terminate
  8. If we found a different key in the host key files, warn the user and terminate

Part of the problem is that at the point where we tell the user that we found a matching SSHFP record, we no longer know whether it was signed. By switching the default for VerifyHostKeyDNS to “yes”, I’m basically saying that I trust DNSSEC more than I trust the average user’s ability to understand the information they’re given and make an informed decision.

DNS again: a clarification

There are a few points I’d like to clarify regarding my previous post about DNS in FreeBSD 10.

Some people were very quick to latch on to it and claim that “FreeBSD announced that Unbound and LNDS will replace BIND as the system’s DNS resolver” or words to that effect. This is, at best, a misunderstanding.

First of all: this is my personal blog. I speak only for myself, not for the FreeBSD project. I participated in the discussions and decision-making and did most of the work related to the switch, but I am neither a leader of nor a spokesperson for the project. As the current Security Officer, I sometimes speak on behalf of the project in security matters, but this is not one of those times. If this had been an official announcement, it would have been posted on the project’s website and / or on the freebsd-announce mailing list, not on my blog (or anybody else’s).

Second: BIND is a very mature, complex and versatile piece of software which implements pretty much every aspect of the DNS protocol and related standards, and is at the forefront of its field. It is developed and maintained by the Internet Systems Consortium, which is a major actor in the development and standardization of the DNS protocol. If you need an authoritative nameserver, or a caching resolver for a large and complex network, BIND is the natural choice. I use it myself, both privately and at work (note: I do not speak for the University of Oslo either). Most of the root servers run BIND. Unbound, on the other hand, is primarily a caching (recursing or forwarding) resolver. Although it has limited support for local zones (serving A, AAAA and PTR records only), which is mostly useful for overlaying information about machines on your RFC1918 SOHO network on top of the data served by a “real” nameserver, it is not capable of running as a full-fledged authoritative nameserver.

Third: due to its key role in Internet infrastructure, BIND is one of the most intensely scrutinized pieces of software. A tiny flaw in BIND can have major consequences for the Internet as a whole. The number and frequency of BIND-related security advisories are more a reflection of its importance than of its quality. Frankly, if you want to talk about code quality and BIND vs LDNS / Unbound… let’s just say that people who live in glass houses shouldn’t throw stones.

Fourth: FreeBSD has shipped with BIND for many years, but BIND was never the FreeBSD’s “system resolver” except in the loosest definition of the term. Most applications that need to perform DNS lookups use either gethostbyname(3) or, preferably, getaddrinfo(3), which are implemented entirely in libc (with code that goes back at least 25 years); I haven’t touched that code, and I don’t plan to. A few applications—notably host(1) and dig(1), which are actually part of BIND—need more fine-grained control over the queries they send and more details about the answers they receive, and use the BIND lightweight resolver library (lwres(3)); these applications have either been replaced by LDNS-based equivalents or deprecated. It is, of course, entirely possible to set up BIND as a local caching resolver; in fact, the default configuration we ship is perfectly suited to that purpose. It’s a little bit more work if you want it to forward rather than recurse—especially on a laptop or a broadband connection without a fixed IP, because you have to set up the resolvconf(8) magic yourself—but it’s not rocket surgery.

Fifth: a major part of the decision to remove BIND, which I stupidly forgot to mention, is that BIND 10 has been completely rewritten in C++ and Python. Importing Python into the base system is out of the question, so we would have been forced to switch sooner or later: at the earliest when users started complaining that we shipped an outdated version, and at the latest when the ISC discontinued BIND 9 entirely.

Sixth: Unbound is not a long-term solution. We needed a caching resolver for FreeBSD 10 and decided to use Unbound because it’s fairly mature and we know it well, but it is a stopgap measure to address the DNSSEC issue while we work on a long-term solution. For FreeBSD 11, we see DNS as only one of several services provided by the Capsicum service daemon called Casper; no decision has yet been made as to which validating resolver library Casper will use as its back-end. In any case, we will continue to provide both authoritative nameserver daemons and caching resolver daemons, such as BIND, NSD, Unbound DNSMasq etc. through the ports system, which can provide better support, access to newer versions, and faster updates than we can in the base system.

Finally, I should add that the ISC has supported the FreeBSD project for many years, both directly and indirectly. Although I haven’t been directly involved in that part of the project, I’m very grateful for their contribution and bear no ill will against them, and I was very unhappy to see my previous post misconstrued as an attack against BIND and the ISC.